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Abstract
With the growth of interest in the attack and defense of
deep neural networks, researchers are focusing more on the
robustness of applying them to devices with limited memory.
Thus, unlike adversarial training, which only considers the
balance between accuracy and robustness, we come to a
more meaningful and critical issue, i.e., the balance among
accuracy, efficiency and robustness (AER). Recently, some
related works focused on this issue, but with different obser-
vations, and the relations among AER remain unclear. This
paper first investigates the robustness of pruned models with
different compression ratios under the gradual pruning pro-
cess and concludes that the robustness of the pruned model
drastically varies with different pruning processes, espe-
cially in response to attacks with large strength. Second, we
test the performance of mixing the clean data and adversar-
ial examples (generated with a prescribed uniform budget)
into the gradual pruning process, called adversarial prun-
ing, and find the following: the pruned model’s robustness
exhibits high sensitivity to the budget, i.e., is only robust
when confronting attacks with the same strength. Further-
more, to better balance the AER, we propose an approach
called blind adversarial pruning (BAP), which introduces
the idea of blind adversarial training into the gradual prun-
ing process. The main idea is to use a cutoff-scale strategy
to adaptively estimate a nonuniform budget to modify the
AEs used during pruning, thus ensuring that the strengths
of AEs are dynamically located within a reasonable range
at each pruning step and ultimately improving the overall
AER of the pruned model. The experimental results ob-
tained using BAP for pruning classification models based
on several benchmarks demonstrate the competitive perfor-
mance of this method: the robustness of the model pruned
by BAP is more stable among varying pruning processes,
and BAP exhibits better overall AER than adversarial prun-
ing.
1. Introduction
Deep learning [26, 10] has enabled great breakthroughs
in many fields, such as computer vision [23], speech recog-
nition [30, 17], and natural language processing [39]. How-
ever, after adversarial examples (AEs) were introduced [41,
11], the weakness of deep neural networks (DNNs) has at-
tracted increasing attention. Many effective AE generation
methods and defensive strategies concerning the balance be-
tween accuracy and robustness are proposed [1, 51]. At the
same time, as the architecture of DNNs has become increas-
ingly expressive, lightweight networks have become one of
the inevitable needs. There are also many effective com-
pression methods [20, 6] concerning the balance between
accuracy and efficiency. However, as DNNs may be ap-
plied on devices with limited memory and face potential
attacks, we need to consider a more meaningful and criti-
cal issue, i.e., the balance among accuracy, efficiency and
robustness (AER), which is the main goal of the proposed
method.
Of these methods to strengthen the robustness of DNNs
against adversarial attacks, i.e., balancing accuracy and ro-
bustness, adversarial training (AT) is the most commonly
used approach, which is a process of training a neural net-
work on a mixture of clean data and AEs; see [41, 11, 29]
for white-box attacks and [24, 44, 38] for black-box attacks.
However, for those AT approaches, it was proven numer-
ically [29] and theoretically [45] that improvement in the
robustness is always accompanied by loss of accuracy. Fur-
thermore, the limitation of incurring a minimal impact on
accuracy requires the architecture of the network to be suffi-
ciently expressive [1, 51], as guaranteed by the universal ap-
proximation theorem [11, 19] and regularization [36]. Thus,
these existing AT approaches may lose efficiency while im-
proving robustness.
Meanwhile, for balancing accuracy and efficiency, nu-
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merous advanced techniques for compacting and accelerat-
ing DNNs have been developed, such as parameter prun-
ing [15, 16] and sharing [5], quantization [46, 14] and bi-
narization [8, 34], low-rank factorization [25, 42], trans-
ferred/compact convolutional filters [7], and knowledge dis-
tillation [4, 18]. Within these methods, parameter pruning is
effective in reducing the network complexity and address-
ing the overfitting problem [6]. Han et al. [15] proposed
an unstructured parameter pruning method to reduce the to-
tal number of parameters and operations in the entire net-
work by pruning redundant or noninformative weights in
a pretrained CNN model. Although the parameter pruning
method can reduce the scale of parameters without signifi-
cantly decreasing the model performance (clean accuracy),
it is unable to ensure the robustness of the model, as dis-
cussed in Reference [49] and Section 2.
Therefore, the exploration of the relationship between
AER of DNNs requires more attention. There are few re-
lated research efforts focused on this stage, and the con-
clusions are divergent. Some of the studies indicate that
adversarial robustness requires a significantly larger capac-
ity of the network than that for the normal training while
maintaining accuracy both numerically [29] and theoreti-
cally [45, 32]. The others suggest active pruning as a de-
fense method [28, 9]. References [13, 47] theoretically an-
alyze the relationship between efficiency and robustness;
their results show that a proper compression ratio can in-
crease the robustness of the model. Guo et al. [13] state
that only the pruned model with less than 2.5% nonzero
weights can achieve the best robustness under FGSM at-
tacks with `∞ norm ε = 0.1. Furthermore, different prun-
ing ratios exert a drastic nonmonotonic impact on robust-
ness, and appropriate sparsity can lead to both good accu-
racy and robustness, whereas over-sparsification may cause
model fragility; the inflection point is related to the attack
budgets. We now give a simple explanation of how these
conclusions diverge. It is known that the main strategy of
model compression, such as model pruning, is to remove or
compress redundant weights of the loss-function involving
only the clean data. Thus, intuitively, normal training with
model pruning (denoted as normal pruning (NP)) discards
weights based on the clean data during pruning, which can
ensure good performance on the clean data but cannot guar-
antee the robustness with respect to adversarial attacks. We
can qualitatively analyze this by a simple two circles classi-
fication problem as in Figure 1. If we use NP, the pruning
only takes into account the loss of clean data. Discarding
the weights corresponding to edges 1 and 2 will not lead to
a decrease in clean accuracy: obviously, only pruning edge
1 will exert no impact on the robustness of the model, while
cutting edge 2 will lower the robustness instead. Since the
importance of edges 1 and 2 to the robustness is not re-
flected in the loss, we may expect that the pruning process
will prune one of them randomly. This means that if we re-
peat pruning several times independently, we will find that
the model’s robustness fluctuates greatly. More numerical
experiments and discussions about the robustness of pruned
models with different compression ratios under the gradual
pruning process (training a random initial model to one with
high accuracy; then, gradually pruning it to one with a tar-
get compression ratio) will be carried out later, and it can be
concluded that model pruning cannot ensure good robust-
ness of the pruned model. Thus, NP exhibits great fluc-
tuation or instability with different pruning processes,
especially under attacks with large strength.
There also exist few related works focused on how to
better balance AER. References [50] combine adversarial
training and weight pruning, finding that the pruning of a
large model can achieve both higher clean accuracy and
adversarial robustness than a small model. ATMC pro-
posed by Gui et al. [12] obtains a remarkably more favor-
able trade-off among model size, accuracy and robustness.
Sehwag et al. [37] improve the robustness of the pruning
model by introducing scaled-initialization of the importance
scores in each layer. Their results could be explained ac-
cording to the benefits of overparameterization [52, 2, 3],
and they focus on improving robustness for a given effi-
ciency or improving efficiency without loss of robustness,
respectively. We refer to this type of method combining
adversarial training and model pruning as an adversarial
pruning (AP) method. We should notice that a primary
characteristic which the existing AP methods have in com-
mon is to use norm-constrained AEs with a prescribed uni-
form budget in the gradual pruning process, and we evalu-
ate the robustness of models by AEs with the same budget.
Because the model discarded weights based on adversar-
ial loss-function during pruning, it can ensure good perfor-
mance on the trained data (the clean data and AEs of the
prescribed budget), but it cannot guarantee the robustness
of attacks with other budgets. From the numerical experi-
ments and discussions about AP, we can conclude that the
pruned model’s robustness shows high sensitivity to the
budget by AP; i.e., the pruned model obtained with the pre-
scribed uniform budget is only robust when confronting at-
tacks with the same strength.
To better analyze the relation between AER, we first pro-
pose an evaluation criterion, also called AER, which can
comprehensively describe the comprehensive performance
of the algorithm with respect to accuracy, efficiency and ro-
bustness. For the later discussion on AER of NP and AP,
we can clearly observe the abovementioned drawbacks of
NP and AP. Furthermore, to ameliorate these drawbacks,
i.e., better balance the AER, we propose an approach called
blind adversarial pruning (BAP) which introduces the
idea of blind adversarial training [48] into the gradual prun-
ing process [14]. Like BAT, the main idea of BAP is to
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Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the two circles classification problem with model pruning. Red and blue circles correspond to the data
distribution to be classified. The orange polygon corresponds to the decision boundary of the training model. Edges 1, 2 and 3 represent
different kinds of edges that may be pruned. (Left) Pruning edge 1 will have no impact on the accuracy and robustness of the model.
(Middle) Pruning edge 2 will have no impact on the accuracy but will reduce the robustness of the model. (Right) Pruning edge 3 will
reduce both accuracy and robustness of the model.
use a cutoff-scale strategy to adaptively estimate a nonuni-
form budget to modify the AEs used in the gradual pruning,
thereby ensuring that the strengths of the AEs are dynami-
cally located within a reasonable range at each pruning step
and ultimately improving the overall AER of the pruned
model. The experimental results obtained using BAP for
pruning classification models based on several benchmarks
(LeNet-5 on MNIST, and FitNet-4 on CIFAR10 and CI-
FAR100) demonstrate the competitive performance of this
method: the robustness of the pruned model by BAP is more
stable with the varying pruning process; BAP exhibits better
overall AER than NP and AP.
2. Analysis of AER
As discussed above, the relationship among accuracy,
efficiency and robustness (AER) seems to be highly non-
straightforward and contextually varying; this section ex-
plores this relationship by focusing on efficiency with re-
spect to model pruning and robustness under adversarial at-
tacks. Thus, we use the compression ratio [6] and attack
budget of AEs (also called norm of AEs perturbation) [11]
to measure the model pruning and adversarial attack.
Mα denotes the compression model of DNN model M
with compression ratio α ∈ (0, 1]. This means that α =
|Mα|/|M |, the ratio of the number of unpruned weights to
the total weights. For given AEs under `p-norm, the attack
budget ε can be defined as
ε = ||δ(x)||p = ||x− xAdv||p, (1)
where δ(x) is the adversarial perturbation, x and xAdv cor-
respond to the clean data and AEs, and we set p = ∞ for
FGSM [11] and p = 2 for DeepFool [31].
Existing methods only change the compression ratio or
attack budget alone; for example, reference [50] compares
different algorithms by considering a given compression ra-
tio and attack budget, while reference [12] compares differ-
ent algorithms by observing different compression ratios in
a fixed attack budget. These methods cannot give compre-
hensive information about AER. To comprehensively char-
acterize AER, this paper considers traversing compression
ratio and attack budget to comprehensively evaluate the
training algorithms. We refer to our evaluation criterion as
AER (accuracy, efficiency and robustness), which is de-
fined by
AER(α, ε) = A(x + δ(x, ε),Mα) (2)
where ε donates the attack budget as Equation (1), and
α is the compression ratio. A(·) shows the accuracy of
model Mα with data x + δ(x, ε), and δ(x, ε) means cut-
off by the norm of adversarial perturbation δ(x) with bud-
get ε, which is defined as δ(x, ε): if ||δ(x)|| > ε, δ(x) ←
δ(x)/||δ(x)|| · ε; otherwise, there is no change in δ(x). It
can be observed by definition that AER can describe the
comprehensive performance of the algorithms with respect
to accuracy, efficiency and robustness.
Furthermore, to simplify the expression and to exhibit
improvements more intuitively in Section 4, average AER
is defined to show the overall performance within an inter-
val of compression ratio α and attack strength ε according
to the expectation of the collection of several independent
pruning processes ξ,
avg-AER(Γ,∆) = Eξ
1
1− Γ
1
∆
∫ 1
Γ
∫ ∆
0
AER(α, ε)dαdε.
(3)
In actual calculations, for each pruning process, we first nu-
merically compute the two-dimensional integration about α
and ε and then average these values for several pruning pro-
cesses. A larger avg-AER(Γ,∆) means that the model ex-
hibits greater overall performance.
3. Blind Adversarial Pruning
The comprehensive performance of the models obtained
by different training strategies is completely different, and
introducing the idea of adversarial training can significantly
improve the robustness of the model under the same com-
pression ratio. References [50] and [12] combine model
pruning and adversarial training into a unified optimiza-
tion framework, but they only consider restricted AT and
the trained model is more capable of resisting attacks of the
given budget. Thus, they only improve the performance of
AER(α, ε) with a fixed attack budget ε, and this cannot ef-
fectively represent the comprehensive performance.
Here, we combine the ideas of blind adversarial train-
ing (BAT) and model pruning, proposing blind adversarial
pruning (BAP), as shown formally in the following for-
mula,
min
θ
E(x,y) max
δ(x)
{L(θ,x + ρδ(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Scale
,y)− λ1||δ(x)||2
−λ2(||δ(x)||2 − ε)+︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cutoff
}+ λ3(||θ||0 − α|θ|)+︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pruning
. (4)
BAP consists of three parts: ‘cutoff’ and ‘scale’ form the
BAT part, and ‘pruning’ forms the model pruning part.
Within the BAT part, the two parameters ε and ρ are used to
control the cutoff and the scale process, respectively. The
parameter α corresponds to the targeted compression ra-
tio, and |θ| indicates the number of elements. Values of
λi, i = 1, 2, 3 represent the Lagrangian multiplier coeffi-
cient, and the formula in the calculation will be solved al-
ternately in blocks, and so the coefficients are only formal
parameters.
The procedure of BAP is given in algorithm 1, with BAT
and pruning parts. BAT attempts to produce a model that
can fully resist attacks of different budgets [48] by using
the unrestricted AE method, DeepFool, which aims for the
decision boundary of a model. BAT proposes a cutoff-
scale (CoS) strategy based on the DeepFool-AT in order to
ensure that the AEs are dynamically located within a rea-
sonable range such that the AT model can be robust when
encountering attacks of varying strengths. The BAT part
starting with the AEs generated by DeepFool corresponds
to only maximizing the first two terms in the objective of
Equation (4) (with ρ = 1), and we simply calculate the third
term (equivalent to minimizing (||δ(x)|| − ε)+) by cutting
off the perturbations of AEs with a norm larger than ε, as de-
fined by δ(x, ε): if ||δ(x)|| > ε, δ(x) ← δ(x)/||δ(x)|| · ε;
otherwise, no change of δ(x). Then, we scale the new per-
turbations with weight ρ and add these CoS AEs into the
training process, i.e., {x + ρδ(x)}. We set ε = E||δ(x)||
Algorithm 1 Blind Adversarial Pruning (BAP)
Input: Dataset {x,y} and hyper-parameters (scale factor
ρ, comparession ratio α, learning rate β).
Output: Model with weights θ.
Initialize model weights θ.
repeat
—BAT part—
LC = L(θ,x,y), . Loss on clean data
δ(x) = xadv − x, . xadv: DeepFool AEs
ε = Ex ||δ(x)||2, . Adaptive Cutoff budget
δCo(x) = cut{δ(x), ε}, . Cutoff AEs
δCoS(x) = ρδCo(x), . Scale AEs
xCoS = x + δCoS(x), . Get CoS AEs
LAE = L(θ,xCoS,y), . Loss on CoS AEs
if θi 6= 0, θ = θ − β(∇θLC +∇θLAE), . Update
with total loss
—Pruning part—
αstep = α+ (1−α)∗ (1− jstep/(NepochNstep per epoch))3
. Current α
Sort θi in ascending order of importance . Order of
importance
θi = 0 if i < αstep|θ| . Prune
until Reach α and accuracy of Cos AEs converge. .
comprehensive performance
and ρ < 1 (a predefined parameter), corresponding to adap-
tively estimating a nonuniform budget. δ(x,E||δ(x)||) im-
plies that the budget ε ← E||δ(x)|| is computed prior to
cutting off the perturbations δ(x). For more details, see the
BAT paper [48].
Next, pruning is conducted by pruning the model param-
eters according to their importance, and the redundant pa-
rameters of the expected proportion are gradually converted
to 0 [14]. First, we obtain the current compression ratio
αstep = α + (1 − α) ∗ (1 − jstep/(NepochNstep per epoch))3,
where α is the targeted compression ratio, jstep indicates the
current step number, Nepoch denotes the number of epochs
that reach targeted α and Nstep per epoch means the number of
steps per epoch. Then, we sort model parameters θi by im-
portance and set redundant parameters to θi = 0 until reach-
ing the current compression ratio αstep if i < αstep|θ|, where
|θ| is the total number of parameters. Alternately, these two
parts update θ gradually if θ 6= 0 until the model reaches
the expected compression ratio and the accuracy values of
Cos AEs converge to the highest value.
The proposed BAP method can obtain a model with com-
prehensive robustness for a given compression ratio. Com-
pared with other training methods, the model obtained by
BAP exhibits better comprehensive performance including
accuracy, efficiency and robustness. See Section 4 for more
information.
4. Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate the BAP approach on var-
ious benchmark datasets. The code for these experiments
is based on the open source library cleverhans [33] for ad-
versarial attack and tensorflow/model-optimization [43] for
model pruning. We consider using BAP to train LeNet-
5 [27] for MNIST [27] and train FitNet-4 [35] for CIFAR-
10 and CIFAR-100 [22]. We compare the BAP approach
with several state-of-the-art training approaches, such as
normal training with model pruning (NP), FGSM-AT (AT
with FGSM AEs) with model pruning (AP (FGSM)), and
DF-AT (AT with DeepFool AEs) with model pruning (AP
(DeepFool)). We mark the type of AE used in the brackets
behind the AP to distinguish between different algorithms,
where AP (FGSM) is also accompanied by a budget mark,
such as AP (FGSM Budget 0.1) as in Figure 2.
Experimental setup. For all of the experiments, we nor-
malize the pixels to [0, 1] by dividing by 255, use label
smoothing regularization [40] to avoid overfitting, and per-
form data augmentation (with a width/height shift range of
0.1 and random flips) for the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
datasets to improve the clean data accuracy. For AE gen-
erations for all of the datasets, we use norm-constrained
FGSM [11] AEs with `∞ norm, and unconstrained Deep-
Fool [31] AEs with `2 norm (number of steps: 5 during
training and 100 during evaluation).
For the training process, we use Adam optimization [21]
with batch size 128 and set the epochs/learning rate of
MNIST as 70/1e-3, with those of CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-
100 set as 200/1e-4 (NP) and 300/1e-4 (AP & BAP), re-
spectively. We set the scale parameter ρ = 0.9 in the BAT
part of BAP for the final results. Within the pruning part,
we prune the model beginning at epoch 0 with pruning fre-
quency 100 batches/steps, ending at epoch 30 for MNIST
and epoch 150 for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100; see algo-
rithm 1 for the dynamic variation formula of compression
ratio.
Compute Overhead. BAP combines the characteristics
of BAT and model pruning, so the calculation cost of each
step is the superposition of these two parts, with no ad-
ditional calculation increase. From the perspective of the
number of epochs, the requirements of BAP and AP meth-
ods are essentially the same, and the numerical experimen-
tation shows that slightly more epochs are required than for
model pruning with NT. Therefore, the BAP method is very
efficient in terms of calculation cost.
Unlike existing work, this article proposes to show
the average and standard deviation of the results through
repeated experiments. This approach has resulted in
large amounts of calculation, especially for CIFAR-10 and
CIFAR-100 datasets. Therefore, in consideration of the lim-
ited computing resources, we have repeated the calculation
results in a targeted manner and indicated them in detail in
the caption of each image. The existing results can fully
explain the improvement effect of our proposed BAP algo-
rithm.
4.1. AER of NP and AP under FGSM attack
First, we analyze NP and AP approaches facing FGSM
attacks on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets as
in Figure 2-4 to show the effects of AER, and we display
the results about accuracy, efficiency and robustness to ana-
lyze the relationships among them. To show the stability of
the algorithm more clearly, we repeat each method several
times, using the solid line to represent the average results
and the shaded area to represent the standard deviation of
these results. At the same time, we show the results of AER
for three-dimensional surfaces, which can more clearly dis-
play the trend of the accuracy as the model compression
ratio and attack budget change.
For each subfigure, different attack budgets have differ-
ent accuracy-compression ratio curves. NP only uses clean
data in training, while AP (FGSM) uses both clean data and
prescribed budget AEs in training, and thus, the accuracy of
the clean data and trained budget AEs is the highest, with
minor fluctuations. In contrast, accuracy under other attack
budgets is lower, with large fluctuations. This result is due
to the training process only considering clean data and AEs
with the budget; the pruning process disregards the weights
that have little impact on these data, but these lost weights
may be very important for attacks with other budgets. It
can be concluded that the redundant weights in loss do not
indicate unimportance for attack. Neither NP nor AP meth-
ods can ensure that the pruned model has good robustness,
and the results drastically vary (exhibit great fluctuation or
instability) with different pruning processes (training a ran-
dom initial model to one with high accuracy and then grad-
ually pruning it to one with the target compression ratio),
especially under attacks of large strength.
By comparing the results of these datasets and carefully
observing each accuracy-compression ratio curve, we can
divide the curve into the stages stable, falling and failing,
corresponding to no significant changes in accuracy, rapid
declines and complete failure of the model, respectively.
Curves of different budgets correspond to different inflec-
tion points in the stable and falling stages. Both NP and
AP perform best with respect to the trained clean data and
AEs with the budget, exhibiting the longest stable stages
and inflection points which are more to the left. AP can
only significantly improve the robustness of the budget. For
curves of different budgets, the farther the budget is from
the prescribed budget or clean data, the faster it will enter
the falling stage. This effect was rarely mentioned in pre-
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Figure 2. Comparison between the NP model and AP model (FGSM budgets ε = 0.1&0.3) of different compression ratios and different
attack budgets for MNIST datasets. Each column corresponds to a different training method, while in each column: (Upper) The solid
colored lines and the corresponding gray area represent the average and standard deviation of the accuracy with different attack budgets
obtained by independently repeating the pruning process 5 times. The wider the gray area is, the more unstable the models robustness.
(Lower) Three-dimensional representation of AER.
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Figure 3. Comparison between the NP model and AP model (FGSM budgets ε = 0.024&0.1) of different compression ratios and different
attack budgets for CIFAR-10 datasets. Each column corresponds to a different training method, while in each column: (Upper) The solid
colored lines and the corresponding gray area represent the average and standard deviation of the accuracy with different attack budgets
obtained by independently repeating the pruning process 5 times for NP and 1 time for AP. The wider the gray area is, the more unstable
the models robustness is. (Lower) Three-dimensional representation of AER.
vious work; for example, Guo et al. [13] report that under
FGSM attacks with `∞ norm ε = 0.1, the pruned model
with less than 2.5% nonzero weights can achieve the best
robustness. However, it can be found from the figure that
at this time, the model only exhibits high robustness under
the 0.1 budget attack and that the robustness against other
budgets has been greatly reduced. Within the falling stage,
the curves corresponding to all budgets decreased and ap-
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Figure 4. Comparison between the NP model and AP model (FGSM budgets ε = 0.024&0.1) of different compression ratios and different
attack budgets for CIFAR-100 datasets. Each column corresponds to a different training method, while in each column: (Upper) The solid
colored lines and the corresponding gray area represent the average and standard deviation of the accuracy with different attack budgets
obtained by independently repeating the pruning process 5 times for NP and 1 time for AP. The wider the gray area is, the more unstable
the models robustness is. (Lower) Three-dimensional representation of AER.
proached. Finally, in the failure stage, curves with different
budgets are no longer significantly different, and they all de-
cline quickly. This result is possibly due to gradient mask-
ing with such high-intensity compression ratios, resulting in
FGSM method failure; at the same time, the model at this
stage has no practical application value.
In summary, compared with the existing evaluation cri-
teria discussed before, we can clearly observe that on the
one hand, our evaluation criterion can more clearly reflect
the comprehensive performance of the model in all aspects
and comprehensively evaluate the accuracy performance of
the model under different compression ratios and facing dif-
ferent budget attacks; on the other hand, the existing AP
(FGSM) methods are based on the prescribed budget, and
they can obviously only guarantee high clean accuracy and
prescribed budget robustness but cannot ensure the robust-
ness with respect to other budget attacks at all, which indi-
cates high sensitivity to the budget.
4.2. AER of NP, AP and BAP under DeepFool attack
Next, we show the BAP results in Figure 5 & 6. Overall,
from the three-dimensional figures, under the same com-
pression ratio and attack budget, BAP achieves the highest
accuracy in most cases with less fluctuations. This result is
expressed as the overall AER surface moving away from the
origin. In a sentence, it is shown that the model obtained by
our BAP exhibits better comprehensive AER performance.
The most notable feature of the result of BAP compared
with the AP methods is that there is no prescribed bud-
get, and the model’s robustness to different attack budgets
is improved by adaptively estimating a nonuniform budget.
Judging from the results, BAP will not produce two peaks
corresponding to budgets like the AP (FGSM) method, as
shown in Figure 3 & 4 with budget 0.1. With an increase
in the budget, the performance of different budget attacks is
improved and the accuracy tends to monotonically decrease.
By carefully observing the value of the results in Table 1,
we can find that the clean accuracy of the results trained
by BAP is significantly higher than that of AP (DeepFool),
which indicates less loss of accuracy caused by the BAP
AEs. Overall, BAP can achieve clean accuracy very close
to that of NP and at the same time can achieve accuracy
close to that of AP (DeepFool) in the face of a very large
budget attack. On this basis, compared with that of NP and
AP (DeepFool), the overall accuracy performance of BAP
with clean data and different budget attacks is very promi-
nent, ranking first in most cases in Table 1, and BAP is ob-
viously stronger than NP and AP (DeepFool). BAP fails to
perform best with respect to individual data, which will be
the subject of further improvement in the future.
We analyze and compare BAP from the point of view of
stability. First, the stability of BAP results under different
attack budgets and compression ratios is compared in Fig-
ure 5. Similarly to the previous analysis, clean accuracy ex-
hibits the best stability, and the accuracy under attack shows
slightly greater instability. However, the overall standard
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Figure 5. Comparison between BAP model, NP and AP (using DeepFool AEs) methods of different compression ratios and different attack
budgets for MNIST datasets. Each column corresponds to a different training method, while in each column: (Upper) The solid lines
in color and the corresponding gray area represent the average and standard deviation of accuracy with different attack budgets obtained
by independently repeating the pruning process 5 times for NP, 1 time for AP and 2 times for BAP. The wider the gray area is, the more
unstable the models robustness. (Lower) Three-dimensional representation of AER.
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Figure 6. Comparison of BAP model with NP of different compression ratios and different attack budgets for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
datasets. Each column corresponds to a different dataset with a different training method, while in each column: (Upper) The solid lines in
color correspond to the accuracy with different attack budgets, as in the legend. (Lower) Three-dimensional representation of AER.
deviation is relatively small and smooth. Comparing the
stability of BAP with that of other methods, we can sum-
marize that the fluctuation of BAP results is not much dif-
ferent from that of the clean accuracy or accuracy of trained
budget (AP) (especially for DeepFool attacks with budgets
less than 0.1) and is significantly less than that of the ac-
curacy under untrained attack budgets (AP). Since the AP
is trained directly using clean data and AEs with the pre-
scribed budget, its fluctuation of trained data is small. Due
to BAP’s use of the dynamically estimated budget of AEs,
AEs with different budgets may be used during training, and
the stability of the calculation results can be guaranteed for
all budgets. BAP thus exhibits better stability than exist-
ing AP methods. Therefore, BAP can achieve better overall
AER performance (taking accuracy, efficiency and robust-
ness into account) with more stable results.
Table 1. Comparison of the AER(α, ε) and avg-AER(Γ,Θ) of BAP with AP (DeepFool) and NP for various datasets, various compression
ratios and various `2 white-box DeepFool attack budgets. Note that AER(α, ε) with ε = 0 corresponds to clean accuracy and that nonzero
ε corresponds to accuracy of AEs with varying attack budgets. We chose 2 different representative α and ε combined with α = 1 and
ε = 0 to show the performance of AER(α, ε) and the corresponding avg-AER(Γ,Θ). We indicate the highest result with bold red and the
second highest result with blue underline.
Defense avg-AER(Γ,Θ) AER(α, ε)
M
ni
st
Γ / α 0.3 0.03 1 1 1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.03 0.03 0.03
Θ / ε 0.05 0.1 0 0.05 0.1 0 0.05 0.1 0 0.05 0.1
NP 88.2 54.0 99.4 82.6 31.1 99.3 42.2 0.7 98.2 10.5 3.0
AP 96.9 90.7 98.9 94.0 77.9 98.6 92.3 74.4 96.4 85.3 57.1
BAP 97.8 92.6 99.3 94.8 81.2 99.3 94.5 78.7 97.1 86.5 58.3
C
ifa
r1
0 Γ / α 0.3 0.03 1 1 1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.03 0.03 0.03
Θ / ε 0.01 0.02 0 0.01 0.02 0 0.01 0.02 0 0.01 0.02
NP 56.1 38.0 90.1 56.7 37.1 87.7 24.5 9.8 77.8 21.6 13.2
BAP 72.0 60.7 82.3 63.9 44.8 82.4 61.0 38.0 77.6 48.0 23.8
C
ifa
r1
00
Γ / α 0.3 0.03 1 1 1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.03 0.03 0.03
Θ / ε 0.002 0.005 0 0.002 0.005 0 0.002 0.005 0 0.002 0.005
NP 49.1 35.7 60.4 35.8 18.4 56.0 38.9 21.1 36.4 31.2 22.5
BAP 48.7 40.9 50.7 43.9 31.2 52.0 44.9 30.8 44.3 38.9 28.0
5. Conclusion and Future Work
Most existing studies only consider efficiency or ro-
bustness alone; fewer research efforts combine accuracy,
efficiency and robustness (AER). In this paper, we ana-
lyze the performance of the model under different com-
pression ratios and attack budgets for the gradual pruning
process, finding that different pruning ratios drastically im-
pact robustness. The robustness of the existing NP ap-
proaches drastically varies with different pruning processes,
especially under attacks with large strength. Few AP ap-
proaches exist that combine efficiency and robustness by
mixing the clean data and AEs with prescribed budgets into
the gradual pruning process; these approaches cannot ob-
tain the models with the best comprehensive performance,
and the robustness of existing models exhibits high sensi-
tivity to the budget and is only robust when confronting
attacks with the same budget. Furthermore, to better bal-
ance the AER between the different training approaches,
this paper proposes a training method based on model prun-
ing and blind adversarial training called blind adversarial
pruning (BAP). The main idea of this approach is to use
BAT to adaptively estimate a nonuniform budget to modify
the AEs used in the training, ensuring that the strengths of
the AEs are dynamically located within a reasonable range,
and to work with pruning to ultimately improve the overall
AER of the pruned model. The experimental results ob-
tained using BAP for pruning classification models on sev-
eral benchmarks demonstrate the competitive performance
of this method: the robustness of the pruned model by BAP
is more stable with varying pruning processes; and BAP ex-
hibits better overall AER than AP does.
The present research is still in the early stage. There are
several aspects that deserve deeper investigation:
• The effectiveness of the BAP algorithm could be ver-
ified through richer numerical experiments, especially
for more complex datasets.
• Theoretical analysis could be combined to discuss
the theoretical commonalities of the AER of different
models.
• The effects and improvement of different training pa-
rameters with respect to the results of BAP could be
studied in greater detail.
• The idea of BAP could be applied to more abundant
compression and adversarial methods to find the es-
sential advantages and disadvantages of the method.
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